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facilitate effective and efficient resource allocation. Most of these visions take 
stylised and static views of financial and commodity markets despite the fact 
that these markets are experiencing dramatic change due to innovation and 
regulation. Accordingly, the paper maps the risks associated in the fusion of 
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1 Introduction   
The paper builds on earlier work (Diaz-Rainey et al., 2011) which explored the financial 
regulation of wholesale energy and environmental markets. Diaz-Rainey et al. 2011, 
however, focused on the energy system and energy markets as they currently are rather as 
to how they are envisaged. This paper, by way of contrast, maps financial risk in the 
energy system of the future (e.g. in 2050). This is done through a theoretical framework 
that draws on qualitative evolutionary models of paradigm shift (e.g. Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990; Dosi, 1982) and in the context of the established literatures on financial 
innovation and financial crises (e.g. Allen et al., 2009; Garber, 1990; Van Horne, 1985). 
The paper should, therefore, be of interest to academics, practitioners, regulators and 
policymakers in as much as it helps to frame the issues. More generally, the research is 
relevant to the fight against climate change and will appeal to a broad range of academic 
audiences including those focussed on: innovation; financial regulation; sustainable 
development; energy policy; and energy modelling. 
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Energy system context 
In response to high fossil fuel prices and growing concerns about climate change, new 
energy production and consumption paradigms have been advocated. Despite contrasting 
visions, techno-market approaches dominate (EU Commission, 2011; Jørgensen, 2005; 
US DOE, 2009; Verbong and Geels, 2010) where the interaction between markets and 
technological innovation, such as smart appliances, smart grids and electric vehicles are 
envisaged. This approach emphasises price signals as central to directing change within 
the energy system, not only altering the energy mix and moving supply from fossil fuels 
towards renewable energy, but also in creating more demand responsive consumers.   
There is a good deal of forward looking work attempting to envisage the 
decarbonised energy system of the future as reflected with current interest in ‘smart 
grids’ (e.g. Battaglini et al., 2009; EU Commission, 2011; US DOE, 2009). Smart grids 
can be understood as the marrying of ICT technologies to the electricity grid in order to 
facilitate an electricity system that allows for demand responsive consumers and 
effectively integrates renewable generation and new consumer technologies such as 
electric vehicles (See Figure 1 for a depiction of a smart grid and Figure 2 for overview 
of the companies involved in smart grid development). 
 As noted above, a central tenet behind most visions of the ‘smart grids’ of the future 
are the price signals that energy markets will deliver to facilitate effective and efficient 
resource allocation. Hence, smart consumers will charge their electric vehicles when 
prices are lowest and feedback to the grid when they are very high. Most of these visions 
take stylised views of (energy) markets consistent with the assumption of perfect 
competition in neo-classical economics (frictionless markets, perfect information etc). 
Markets rarely work this way with a myriad of departures from the classical model (low 
liquidity, counterparty risk, financial contagion and speculative bubbles) likely to create 
unanticipated risks.  
 
Financial system context 
Currently financial markets are experiencing dramatic change due to innovation and 
regulatory changes (see Hendershott et al., 2011; Haldane, 2010; O’Hara and Ye, 2011). 
High Frequency Trading and increasingly integration have made markets increasingly 
responsive and volatile. Exchange Traded Funds mean that retail investors have access to 
any asset class they wish to invest in (be it commodities, venture capital or hedge funds). 
Technology and deregulation have meant organised exchanges are having their market 
shares eroded by cheaper Alternative Trading Systems posing real challenges for 
financial regulation.  
Further, the functioning of commodity and energy markets is currently the source of 
considerable interest among policymakers, regulators, academics and industry 
practitioners. Rising commodity market prices generally and in particular high oil prices 
have triggered a debate as to the role of ‘speculation’ in commodity markets. The concern 
is that financial investors are causing commodities to overshoot their market 
fundamentals. Accordingly, though the increased participation of institutional (including 
High Frequency Traders) and individual (through Exchange Traded Funds) investors in 
commodity markets is beyond doubt, what remains open to contrasting assessments and 
opinion is their impact on price formation (Buyuksahin and Harris, 2011, Diaz-Rainey et 
al., 2011; Lombardi and Van Robays, 2011; Turner et al., 2011). Indeed, there is some 
 anecdotal evidence of new risks emerging from the fusion of financial innovation with 
the increasingly marketised energy system. For instance, it is believed that prior to its 
collapse Amaranth Advisors LLC, an energy focussed hedge fund, played a major role in 
destabilising the gas market in 2006 (Levine and Coleman, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 1 Energy Smart Grid  
(Source: Smart Grid 2030) 
 
Figure 2 Companies involved in Smart Grid development  
(Source: GreenTech Media) 
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Research question and paper structure 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that the process of innovation in the energy 
system has coincided with financial innovation and turbulence in global financial and 
commodity markets. This paper explores potential risks arising from the fusion of 
innovations from two ‘systems’ (or sectors), namely the financial system and the energy 
system as both sectors evolve. The paper, therefore, addresses the following question: 
What are the financial and financially-induced energy policy risks associated with the 
emergence of Decarbonised-Techno-Market Energy Systems in the broader context of 
rapid financial innovation? In order to answer this question the paper is structured as 
follows; section 2 provides a review of the established literatures on financial innovation 
and financial crises, section 3 outlines the theoretical framework, while section 4 maps 
the financial risks associated in the fusion of financial innovation with innovation in the 
energy system. Section 5 provides concluding remarks, including policy 
recommendations and suggestions for further research.     
2 Literature review: Technological and financial innovation, crises and risk  
Financial crises are increasing in frequency (Bordo et al., 2001). This should be an issue 
of concern as the energy system is increasingly ‘marketised’. Accordingly the established 
literatures on financial crises (2.1) and past work addressing relationship technological 
and financial innovation and financial risk are reviewed (2.2). 
 
2.1 Financial crises 
Each financial crisis is unique but certain underlying causes tend to recur. In this respect 
it is useful to reflect on the causes, the nature and the consequences of financial crises.  
A factor common in many crises is the bursting of speculative bubbles which are 
often in turn associated with innovation, be it technological or financial (See 2.2 below 
and Perez, 2009). Hindsight tends to interpret speculative bubbles as ‘pathologies of 
group psychology’ which may neglect the role legitimate bull market fundamentals play 
in driving investors’ behaviour (Garber, 1990). Accordingly, bull market fundamentals 
can lead to a situation of ‘strategic complementarity’ where investors second-guess each 
others’ attempts to benefit from the market fundamentals by investing in an attempt to 
benefit from the anticipated investment of others’. This ultimately leads to a speculative 
bubble. 
Financial crises are also associated with; (1) excessive risk taking as reflected in the 
use of leverage in its many guises (direct loans, use of derivatives etc), which in turn can 
often be associated with loose monetary policy; (2) intense competition can lead to 
efficient market outcomes in the short term but can leave institutions/market participants 
unable to withstand adverse market shocks or conditions (Allen and Gale, 2004); (3) 
fraud and firm failures; and (4) regulatory failure which is perhaps most clearly 
highlighted in the context of the recent credit crunch of 2007-2008 by the limitations of 
the ‘backward looking’ risk assessments that BASEL II accord permitted when 
evaluating bank capital adequacy (Goddard et al., 2009).  
Turning to the nature of crises, it is well established that during crises correlations 
between assets increase as investors become indiscriminately risk averse leading to 
contagion to markets which may not have any fundamental or underlying problem (Baig 
and Goldfajn, 1999). Further, it would seem that the dual effects of (1) technology 
 ‘speeding up’ finance and (2) the spreading of risk through financial innovation and 
increasingly integrated financial markets, has meant that the likelihood of financial 
contagion is higher than ever (Allen et al., 2009; Haldane, 2010). The effects of crises 
include loss of confidence in markets, systemic threats and can have real (macro) 
economic costs, though all of these must be balanced against the costs of regulation.  
 
2.2. Speculative bubbles and innovation 
As noted above, financial crises are also associated with innovation. Van Horne 
(1984) argues that it is not the financial innovations per se that are the problem, rather it 
can be unscrupulous schemes masquerading as such that cause the real difficulties, 
though ex ante differentiation of the two is not easy.  Further, the ‘dot.com’/telecoms 
bubble and the recent ‘credit crunch’ have led to renewed examinations of the 
interactions between innovation, technological paradigms and financial crises from a neo-
Schumpeterian/evolutionary perspective. For instance, Perez (2009) distinguishes 
between bubbles driven by technological innovation and those driven by financial 
conditions (excessive liquidity), noting that the former tend to occur mid-way through a 
technological paradigm shift. Both Perez (2009) and Kam (2006) observe that though 
bubbles driven by changing technological paradigms may cause severe economic 
dislocations they are part of a natural Schumpeterian economic phenomenon of ‘creative 
destruction’. Fransman (2004, p.405) concurs but suggests how some of the more 
dramatic excesses may be dampened by producing “greater variety in thinking” so as to 
challenge inflated ‘Consensus Visions’. This adds to the long established 
recommendations in this area related to effective financial regulation and adequate 
knowledge of financial history (Galbraith, 1954). 
3 Theoretical framework: Evolutionary models of paradigm shift 
As noted in the introduction, this paper addresses the following question: What are the 
financial and financially-induced energy policy risks associated with the emergence of 
Decarbonised-Techno-Market Energy Systems in the broader context of rapid financial 
innovation? Accordingly the next section provides a qualitative conceptualisation of the 
risks associated in the fusion of financial innovation with innovation in the energy system 
through a theoretical framework that draws on qualitative evolutionary models of 
paradigm shift (see below) and in the context of the established literatures on financial 
innovation and financial crises (reviewed in Section 2). 
 
3.1 Models of paradigm shift 
 
“A paradigm is thus a collectively shared logic at the convergence of 
technological potential, relative costs, market acceptance, functional coherence 
and other factors.”      Perez (2010, pp.186-187) 
 
Perez (2010) provides a review of the established models of technological paradigm shift. 
These models have Schumpeterian roots and including work by Anderson and Tushman 
(1990), Dosi (1982) and Geels and Schot (2007). For instance, Anderson and Tushman 
(1990) provide a model of technological paradigm shift at the industrial level triggered by 
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a technological ‘discontinuity’, while Geels and Schot (2007) present an increasingly 
utilised multi level perspective with alternative transition pathways. 
These general models of paradigm shift have been complemented by research 
focussing on transition in the energy sector (See Section 3.2, below) and by work 
emphasising finance and financial markets as important yet imperfect selection 
mechanisms (Fransman, 2004; Dosi and Nelson, 1994). The notion of finance as an 
important selection mechanism is a complement to the improved understanding of the 
interplay between innovation, technological paradigms and financial crises discussed 
earlier (See Section 2.2).  
 
3.2 Alternative visions for the energy system of the future 
Some of the key attributes of the energy system of the future include (see Figure 1; US 
DOE, 2009; Valocchi et al., 2010; Verbong and Geels, 2010): 
• Efficient, green and secure energy: Efficient and secure allocation of decarbonised 
energy enabled by energy markets and ICT innovations including hardware and 
software (See Figure 2). 
• New energy market participants and services: An increased emphasis on energy 
services rather than energy consumption with new 3rd party market participants 
intermediating (often referred to as Aggregators and/or Energy Services Companies 
(ESCOs)) between the energy system/market and end users.  
• Demand side management and price responsive consumers: Enabled by 
technological innovations such as smart appliances and smart meters, as well as the 
aforementioned ‘Aggregators’ and their new services. 
• Integration of renewables: In particular intermittent wind generation. 
• Energy storage: Storage is again expected to be facilitated by technological 
innovation such as improved battery technologies. 
• Integration of Electric Vehicles (EV): Increasingly EVs are seen not just as a drain 
on the system but as an intergraded component for balancing due to the possibility of 
using EV batteries as a form of energy storage that can feedback into the grid (US 
DOE, 2009). 
• ‘Prosumers’: Consumers being also producers give small scale generating 
technologies such as photovoltaic generation and small scale wind turbines. The 
ability to be a ‘prosumers’ is enabled by technologies such as bi-directional smart 
meters. 
 
Most visions of the future share these attributes, however, there are contrasting 
configuration of the future end state of the energy system within the boundaries of these 
attributes (Battaglini et al., 2009; Foxon et al., 2010; Verbong and Geels, 2010).  
These contrasting visions have been articulated using evolutionary models of 
paradigm shift (Verbong and Geels, 2010; Foxon et al., 2010). For instance, Verbong and 
Geels (2010) apply the Geels and Schot (2007) multi level approach with alternative 
transition pathways to energy sector paradigm change. Specifically they identify three 
transition pathways (TPs) which are described in Table 1 and which are assessed with 
respect to the degree of ‘network change’ they imply relative to the existing network 
configuration and the principal ‘dynamic’ driving change.  
Although the TPs differ in terms of how radical they are with respect to network 
configuration, all three require large scale investment (Verbong and Geels, 2010, p.1219). 
 Further, though Verbong and Geels (2010) and Foxon et al. (2010) provide enlightening 
panoramas of the future they do not considered finance and financial markets in detail. 
The presumption is that the financing needed for whichever pathway is taken will be 
delivered. As noted earlier finance and financial markets are a critical yet imperfect 
enabler and selection mechanism (Section 3.1). 
 
Table 1 Alternative visions for the energy system in the long term 
Transition 
Pathway 
Description Network 
Change 
Dynamic 
TP 1: 
Transformation 
or ‘Hybrid 
Smart Grids’ 
Centralised generation continues to dominate but 
is complemented by renewables and small scale 
distributed generation. Network infrastructure 
remains principally defined at the national level. 
Use of fossil fuels continues but Carbon Capture 
and Storage ensures system is de-carbonised. 
Medium Economic: the 
market as an 
organising 
force 
TP 2: 
Reconfiguration 
or ‘Super Smart 
Grid’ 
Supranational/regional energy policy (e.g. EU) 
results in the creation of a transnational super 
gird that geographically diversifies away the 
intermittency problem of renewables thereby 
allowing for fully renewable-based system.  
High Economic and 
political: The 
market and 
international 
collaboration 
as organising 
forces 
TP 3: 
Re-alignment or 
‘Distributed 
Smart Grids’ 
This TP can be seen as the opposite response to 
TP 2 to energy policy challenges (see Figure 5). 
There is an increased emphasis on energy 
conservation and local small-scale renewables 
generation. The national network is replaced by 
‘loosely coupled regional and local grids (micro 
grids)’ (Verbong and Geels, 2010).    
High Localism: A 
decentralised 
and localised 
response to 
energy policy 
challenges 
Source: Adapted from Verbong and Geels (2010) and Battaglini et al., 2009 
 
 
3.3. The fusion of financial and energy system innovations 
The fusion of financial and energy system innovations raise a number of questions: 
• The evolution of energy markets in a ‘smart’ energy system. What impact will an 
increased number of market participants have on counterparty risk? What are the 
micro-prudential considerations of such a change? How will market risk alter with 
‘prosumers’, demand responsive consumers and increased energy storage? What will 
be the market liquidity effects of these changes and what role will new (e.g. energy 
services companies) and existing market intermediaries and institutions play in the 
new paradigm?  
• Integration and contagion. What impact will the integration of energy markets 
geographically, across fuel types (due to technological change) and with financial 
markets have on the likelihood of financial contagion? 
• Green energy speculative bubble. What is the likelihood of such a bubble? What 
fundamental drivers might trigger it: supply problems (e.g. evidence of peak oil); 
environmental concern (e.g. climate change); financial innovation (e.g. Exchange 
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Traded Funds); technological innovation (e.g. breakthrough in electricity storage)? 
What impact would such a bubble have on the quantity and timing of energy 
infrastructure investment and energy technology choice (i.e. the interaction between 
primary energy financing and secondary energy markets)?  
• Ex ante legislative mitigation of risks. How can institutions responsible for 
financial regulation/market governance (financial regulators, energy regulators, 
power exchanges etc) be adapted to be responsive to any new risks? Are the 
jurisdictional boundaries likely to be a limiting factor to risk mitigation in 
increasingly integrated markets? 
 
From the above questions it is clear that it is useful to characterise risks as either 
emanating from primary (when a security is first issues raising cash for the firm issuing 
it) or secondary (the subsequent trading of the security) markets. Further it is clear that 
the response to a lot of the questions above will be moderated by the nature of the energy 
system of the future. As described above (Section 3.2) there are alternative visions of the 
energy system in the long run. These different visions and the distinction between 
primary and secondary market related risks are used in the mapping of future financial 
risks.  
4 Evolution and mapping of financial risks  
Underlying hypothesis of the research question is that financial risk will increase with 
marketisation and that the nature of that risk will depend on the nature of the future 
energy paradigm. Accordingly, prior to mapping the financial risk associated with fusion 
of innovation in both sectors, we explore the evolution of financial risk in the energy 
sector.  
 
4.1 Evolution of market risk in the energy 
This section highlights that as the energy sector is liberalised and increasingly 
‘marketised’ energy utility companies will need to take on increasing amounts of market 
or systemic risk as a result of competitive pressures (Diaz-Rainey et al., 2011; Nwaeze, 
2000). Nwaeze (2000) reports for US Energy Utilities that the shift towards competition 
leads to increased earnings variability as measure by return on assets (ROA) and return 
on equity (ROE). Further, the study found that there were significant increases in 
systematic risk around the dates of liberalisation reforms and negative abnormal returns 
around events associated with reform.  
We provide a more up to date perspective of financial risk in the European energy 
system. We report for the period since liberalisation started in the mid 1990s time series 
of Value-at-Risk (VAR) derived from the total return data from a European energy utility 
index (Figure 3) and we calculate the average Beta for a group of 28 European utility 
companies (Figure 4). Both VAR and Beta are accepted measures related to market risk 
(Dowd, 2005). 
 Figure 3 indicated that the VAR from an investor perspective has increased over the 
period with peaks coinciding with the spike in oil prices in 2007/2008. Such a result 
would not be surprising if the analysis was on oil majors (Boyer and Filion, 2007) but is 
more surprising for energy utilities and might indicate that they are taking on 
considerable commodity price risk.  Figure 4 indicates that systemic risk, as measured by 
 Beta, has been on an upward trajectory for European utility companies since the bursting 
of the ‘dot.com’ bubble. This may, in the initial years post 2000, reflect the changing 
make-up of the market index with riskier technology firms becoming less prominent but 
this is unlikely to explain the rising trend in more recent years.   
 
 
 
Figure 3 VAR of a hypothetical €1,000,000 investment in the STOXX 600 Utilities 
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Figure 4 Average Beta of selected European utilities companies  
Note: Calculated using the STOXX Europe Total Market Index, outliers removed 
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Figure 5 Evolution and Fusion of Energy and Financial Systems 
 
 
4.2 Mapping of risks to the financial and energy systems 
 
Figure 5 shows the overarching drivers of change and ultimate fusion of the energy and 
financial systems as both have been liberalised and integrated, while Table 2 maps 
financial risks associated with this transitions in terms of specific factors or attributes 
associated with the new energy paradigm. These financial risks are in turn rated (High, 
Medium, Low) in terms of their importance in the alternative visions of the energy 
system in the long run (see Section 3.2). Further, Table 2 specifies whether the risk 
relates to primary or secondary markets. 
 
Primary market risks 
Irrespective of transition pathway it is clear that a shift in energy paradigm is likely to 
occur as it is underpinned by strong fundamental changes (Figure 5) and that this shift 
will have broader implication to the economy and society. Such a transition is likely to 
lead to a ‘major technology bubble’ (See Table 2 and Perez, 2009). As noted earlier such 
bubbles are generally regarded as inevitable and are preferable to ‘easy liquidity bubbles’ 
as the former have positive transformative economic effects (See Section 2.2).   
Further, Perez (2009, p.780) observes that a major technology bubble “regularly 
occurs midway along the process of assimilation of each technological revolution”. If we 
date of beginning of the Telegestore project in Italy in 2000, the first large scale 
time 
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deployment of a critical enabling technology (Smart meters), as the beginning point of 
transition and the often cited 2050 date as the end of transition (Diaz-Rainey, 2009) we 
should expect the bursting of a related speculative bubble around 2025. Interestingly the 
2000 commencement date also coincides roughly with mounting concerns about climate 
change between the second and third IPCC assessment and with a take-off in deployment 
of another important related technology, wind energy (See Davies and Diaz-Rainey, 
2011).  
Clearly the possibility and timing of a bubble could have major implications for the 
scale and timing of related investments. In some senses the ‘strategic complementarity’ 
that such a bubble could create and the impetus to investment that would follow would 
seem to be desirable from a public policy perspective up to a point. However, the 
bursting of such a bubble should not come as a surprise to policymakers and it might 
need mitigating actions to support future investment in energy sector transition and 
actions to dampen the effect of the bubble bursting on the broader economy and financial 
markets. One would hope that such action would not be overly loose monetary policy that 
leads to ‘easy liquidity bubble’ as in the case of the credit crunch of 2007 with its 
antecedents in the ‘dot.com’ mania of 2000 (Allen et al., 2009; Perez, 2009).  
Of the three TPs (Table 2), TP 2 is the one most likely to cause a bubble since it 
implies the greatest business opportunity, reflecting a high risk reward trade-off. Investor 
interest in TP 3 is likely to be much lower which in turn may mean that enabling 
technologies that need to come to market do not develop as quickly as might be desired 
raising questions about the viability and speed of this transition pathway (See Table 2). 
 
Secondary market risks  
TP2 also stands out from an environmental and efficiency perspective as it offers the 
appealing prospect of 100% renewables generation and a stable system due to its 
centralised supergrid that diversifies away the intermittency problem of renewables 
(Diaz-Rainey, 2009; Roques et al. 2010). Further, due to its size, the energy market at its 
core is likely to be very liquid, with this liquidity increasing as it attracts financial 
investors in search of new asset classes to invest in (Table 2). These benefits come with 
the potential costs of; 
• increases in volatility (especially if there is uncertainty about fundamentals)  
• higher possibilities of market manipulation and speculation (facilitated by 
improved energy storage) and  
• higher risks of financial contagion in times of financial stress. (See Table 2 and 
Section 2.1) 
Finally, all three TPs pose new challenges with respect to potential abuse of retail 
customers and new challenges with respect to counterparty risk. 
5 Conclusions and policy implications 
The functioning of commodity and energy markets is currently receiving wide spread 
attention from a range of policymakers and regulators due to concern about speculation in 
these markets. This paper has highlighted some of the impacts that the marketisation of 
the energy sector is having on financial risk in the sector (Section 3.1). Moreover, the 
paper explored how innovation in the energy and finance sectors is likely to change the 
functioning of these markets and what associated risks may arise (Section 3.2.). Prior to 
 this paper, most visions of the 'smart grid' of the future assume perfect (financial or 
energy) markets. From this a number of conclusions can be drawn. 
At the most basic level this paper highlights the need to take a more sophisticated 
understanding of financial markets and financial innovation in the planning for the 'smart 
grid' of the future. Of the risks identified in the risk mapping process two categories of 
risk stand out as particularly requiring the attention of policymakers, namely (1) those 
related to increased risk of manipulation, speculation, contagion and volatility in the 
functioning of secondary energy markets and (2) those associated with the bursting of a 
‘major technology bubble’ and its impact on financing energy sector transition through 
primary markets. In the latter case, some over exuberance may be desirable in 
accelerating investment but policymakers should not be surprised by the emergence of 
such a bubble (not least since we have predicted it will happen in 2025! See Section 4.2.) 
and should be prepared to intervene in a way so as not to repeat the mistakes of recent 
years i.e. with the response to a ‘major technology bubble’ (the ‘dot.com’ mania) 
contributing to the creation of an ‘easy liquidity bubble’ (the ‘credit crunch’) (see Allen 
et al. 2009; Perez, 2009). 
The former set of risks highlights the need for effective financial regulation of energy 
markets as they evolve and are increasingly integrated with conventional financial 
markets. Thus, there is clearly a need for an analysis of the evolving approach to the 
monitoring of energy markets within the context of these risks. From an EU perspective, 
this needs to consider the new European architecture for financial regulation which 
includes the establishment of new institutions such as European Systemic Risk Board and 
European Securities and Markets Authority. Further, from the EU energy policy side, the 
latest push for further energy market integration has created a pan-European body 
(Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators) with purportedly a market 
monitoring role (See Diaz-Rainey et al., 2011; EU Commission, 2010).  
A number of limitations in our analysis highlight further research needs, namely; (1) 
to econometrically test the factors driving the changes depicted in Figures 3 and 4 and 
control for confounding effects; (2) to quantify the risks mapped in Table 2 perhaps 
through a survey of experts; and (3) to explore geographical differences since the current 
risk mapping has been premised on the basis that further energy system integration is 
possible (as in the case of Europe and North America) but this is clearly not applicable in 
countries like New Zealand. 
Notwithstanding the research needs already outlined the main implications in this 
respect are, however, related to science policy in this area; namely that when 
commissioning research into 'smart grids', funders need to ensure financial innovation 
and associated risks are incorporated in their assessments. In particular, formal models of 
energy systems transitions (such as the UK MARKAL-Macro Model used by UK Energy 
Research Centre) need to incorporate a more nuanced understanding of financial risks 
and the relationship between innovation and financial and commodity markets. Other 
formal modelling that could follow on from this work might include: (1) agent based 
simulations of the interaction of energy and conventional financial markets in times of 
financial stress (see Allen et al., 2009; Diaz-Rainey et al., 2011); (2) extend portfolio 
theory based energy planning modelling (Awerbuch, 2006) to incorporate technological 
change and forward projections of energy market volatility (See Table 2); (3) modelling 
and empirically testing the assertion by Perez (2009, p.780) that speculative bubbles burst 
halfway through a paradigm shifts using established innovation diffusion models (See 
Davies and Diaz-Rainey, 2011). 
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